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NAT'L CRUSHED STONE ASS'N 
Cert to CA4 (Haynsworth, 
Widener) 
COSTLE (Admin. EPA) Cert to CA4 (Butzner, Widene , ....,_._ ____ 
Hall) 
v. 
CONSOLIDATION COAL CO. Federal/Civil Timely (w/extns) 
1. SUMMARY: EPA challenges two judgments of the CA4, 







33 u.s.c. § 13ll(b) (1), must include a variance provision 
requiring EPA consideration of the ability of an individual 
discharger of pollutants to afford the costs of compliance. 
EPA also suggests that CA4 erred in considering the validity of 
the variance clauses at issue before those clauses were applied 
to any individual discharger. 
2. STATUTORY BACKGROUND: Section 30l(b) of the Act, 
adopted in the Federal ~~ater Pollution Control Act Amendments 
of 1972, authorizes EPA to issue two sets of industrial 
established in 1977 based on "the best practicable control 
technology currently available," referred to as BPT 
limitations; and regulations to go into effect not later than 
~ July 1, 1987, based on the "best available technology 
I 
economically achievable," referred to as BAT limitations. (At 
the time of this Court's opinion in E.I. du Pont de Nemours & 
Co. v. Train, 430 u.s. 112 (1977), the BAT limitations were to 
have been effective by July 1, 1983. The effective date was 
postponed by the Clean Water Act of 1977.) This Court's du 
Pont opinion established EPA's authority to enact BPT 
limitations by regulation on an industry-wide basis, "so long 
as some allowance is made for variations in individual 
plants." 430 u.s. at 128. Consideration of the standard 
~
variance provision that EPA had developed was deemed by this 
Court 
n.l9. 
to be premature at that 
The~ presented in 
time, however. See id. at 128 
this case concerns the scope of 
the variance provision included in EPA regulations governing 
the BPT limitations established for two industries. 
/ 
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The Act lists factors that are relevant to EPA's 
determination of what the "best practicable control technology" 
and "best available control technology" requires. Section 
304(b} (1} (B) states that factors relevant to the BPT 
limitations include: 
consideration of the total cost of application of 
technology in relation to the effluent reduction benefits 
to be achieved from such application, and shall also take 
into account the age of equipment and facilities involved, 
the process employed, the engineering aspects of the 
application of various types of control techniques, process 
changes, non-water quality environmental impact (including 
energy requirements), and such other factors as the 
Administrator deems appropriate .... 
Section 304 (b) (2) (B) lists the factors to be taken into 
account in assessing the more stringent BAT limitations. They 
are identical except that they do not include "consideration of 
the total cost of application of technology in relation to the 
effluent reduction benefits to be achieved." However, § 30l(c) 
of the Act does provide that the Administrator may modify the 
requirements of the BAT limitations for a particular discharger 
of pollutants who can show that such modifications "(1} will 
represent the maximum use of technology within the economic 
capability of the owner or operator; and (2} will result in 
reasonable further progress toward the elimination of the 
discharge of pollutants." 
3. FACTS and OPINIONS BELOW: In April, 1977, the EPA 
adopted regulations establishing BPT limitations on discharges 
from existing point sources in coal preparation plants and 
other subcategories of the coal mining industry. In July, 
1977, the agency published similar regulations governing the 
\ 
crushed stone and construction sand industry. Both 
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l~ promulgations included EPA's standard variance provision for 
BPT limitations. In brief, that provision allows the permit 
issuing authority (EPA or state agencies with Nat'l Pollutant 
Discharge Elimination Systems) to consider whether the 
individual discharger's cost of compliance with the limitations 
significantly exceeds the costs of other dischargers in the 
same industry. This provision is designed to permit an 
individual discharger to show that its costs of complying with 
the BPT limitations will be greater than the average costs 
considered by EPA in establishing the national guidelines. 
The issuing authority may not consider or grant a variance, 
however, based upon a claim that an individual discharger 
cannot afford the "best practical technology." In effect, 
EPA's position is that § 30l(c) 's allowance of waivers based 
upon plant-specific considerations of economic hardship is 
applicable only to BAT limitations. 
Petitions to review both sets of regulations were filed in 
various CAs, and all were ultimately transferred to CA4. 
a. Nat'l Crushed Stone 
In Nat'l Crushed Stone Ass'n v. EPA, the CA remanded 
several substantive regulations to the EPA for 
reconsideration. Those substantive regulations are not at 
issue here. With respect to the variance provisions, the CA 
ruled that they did not comport with its earlier opinion in 
Appalachian Power Co. v. Train, 545 F.2d 1351, 1358-60 (CA4 
1976), and remanded them to the EPA for compliance with that 
earlier opinion. (The relevant portion of the opinion is 
' I repr1nted at pp. 29a-35a of the petn.) 
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The regulations at issue in Appalachian Power had 
established BPT limitations on the discharge of heat into 
navigable waters from steam electric generating plants. The CA 
found that the variance clause included in those regulations, 
identical to the clause contained in the sand and crushed stone 
regulations, permitted consideration of technical and 
engineering factors, exclusive of cost, in granting variances. 
The CA concluded that thus interpreted, the clause was unduly 
restrictive. The CA's conclusion was based on the fact that 
the more stringent BAT limitations contemplated waivers based 
on cost; logically, the temporary BPT standards should be no 
less flexible. Moreover, theCA found that EPA's standard 
variance clause did not include consideration of factors 
specifically set forth in § 30 4 (b) ( 1) (B) , such as the total 
cost of applying the best practicable technology and the 
non-water quality environmental impact. 
In Nat'l Crushed Stone, the CA found that the standard 
variance clause suffered from the same deficiencies as had the 
().... 
clause in Applachian Power. It rejected EPA's claim that 
review of the clause would be premature prior to any actual 
claim for a variance in a discharge permit application because 
EPA's position on such applications had been made clear in 
administrative opinions. The CA did note that EPA had 
promulgated a new policy with respect to variances on August 
21, 1978, which would have placed the agency's views more in 
line with Appalachian Power, but that policy specifically noted 
that "EPA continues to beli e ve that § 30l(c) •.. applies only 
\ 
to ••• (BAT) limitations." See 43 Fed. Reg. 50042 (1978). 
,. --··--.. ,.._._.... 
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Thus, EPA's policy remained inconsistent with Appalachian 
Pov1er, which had required the agency to take § 301 (c) into 
account in developing its variance provision. 
TheCA rejected EPA's argument that the § 30l(c) 
requirements would permit plants to obtain a variance simply 
because they could not afford to comply with the BPT 
limitation~ Rather, § 30l(c) permits a variance only if the 
plant is doing all that the maximum use of technology within 
its economic capacity will permit and such use will result in 
reasonable further progress toward the elimination of the 
discharge of pollutants. EPA's argument, "no better than [a] 
straw m[a]n," had been considered and rejected iri Appalachian 
Power. The argument was not even addressed to the principal 
concerns of the industry challengers to the variance, who 
wanted specific factors, other than affordability, to be 
considered in applications for variances. 
Finally, the CA noted that its construction of the variance 
provisions were in general accord with that of the CADC in 
Weyerhauser Co. v. Costle, 590 F.2d 1011 (1978). That court 
had held that a BPT variance clause must be analogous to a BAT 
variance clause, as CA4 had held in Appalachian Power. 
b. Consolidation Coal 
In the Consolidation Coal case, a different panel of CA4 
held that the substantive BPT limitations regulating the coal 
mining industry were valid. The industry challengers also 
complained, however, that the variance clause in those 
regulations failed to require the permit issuing authority to 
consider the factors set forth in §§ 301 (c) and 304 (b) (1) (B) of 
·. 
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the Act. The CA noted that the clause a~ issue was identical 
to the clause considered in Nat'l Crushed Stone, and remanded 
the variance regulations for revision in conformity with the 
opinion in that case. (The relevant portion of the opinion is 
reprinted at pp. 50a-52a of the petn.) 
3. CONTENTIONS: 
a. The SG 
Despite that court's conclusion to the contrary, the GA 
contends that the views of CA4 are in conflict with the views 
of the CADC in Weyerhauser. In Weyerhauser, CADC held that an 
identical variance clause, included in the regulations 
governing the pulp paper industry, can be applied with 
sufficient flexibility to enable the court to conclude that it 
provided for the meaningful variance required by this Court's 
du Pont decision. The CADC also concluded that the ability to 
secure variances from the BPT limitations requirements should 
be analogous to the statutorily provided ability to secure 
variances with respect to the more stringent BAT limitations. 
590 F.2d at 1034. However, with respect to the relevance of 
economic hardship, CADC concluded "emphatically,'' that: 
Although the ''total cost" of pollution control at the 
petitioning mill must be considered under a satisfactory 
variance provision, it is only relevant "in relation to the 
effluent reduction benefits to be achieved" at that mill, 
section 304(b) (1) (B); so long as those costs relative to 
the pollution reduction gains are not different from those 
that may be imposed on the industry as a whole, the 
difficulty, or in fact the inability, of the oper~tor to 
absorb the costs need not control the variance decision. 
590 F.2d at 1036 (emphasis in original). Thus, the SG asserts 




The SG contends that this issue is important because the 
identical variance clause has been issued in regulations 
~ governing 40 other industries. If CA4's view is followed, and 
pollutant dischargers can obtain exemptions from BPT 
limitations requirements on the basis of their inability to 
afford the requisite technological controls, Congress' 
objective of eliminating pollution of the nation's navigable 
waters will be frustrated. 
Finally, CA4's view is inconsistent with the legislative 
history of the 1972 amendments. Congress deliberately adopted 
the BPT limitations as a minimum level of effluent control that 
all dischargers must meet, even if the cost of compliance with 
those limitations would drive some dischargers out of 
business. CA4 ignored this legislative history when it based 
its decision on the abstract logical proposition that the less 
stringent requirements of the BPT limitations should be as 
flexible as the more stringent requirements of the BAT 
limitations, which allow for modifications under the standards 
of§ 30l(c). The reason that Congress wanted the BPT 
limitations to be administered less flexibly is that those 
requirements were intended to establish a minimum floor on the 
control of pollutant discharge. 
The SG raises a second question for review by this Court, 
though his presentation of this question is somewhat 
tentative. He continues to argue, as the EPA argued below, 
that judicial review of the variance clauses was premature 
because no individual discharger has actually been denied a 
variance. However, because the EPA's position on the 
c 
- 9 -
interpretation to be given the variance provisions has become 
clear, and because it presents a discrete legal issue, it may 
be capable of pre-enforcement review under Abbott Laboratories 
v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 149-53 (1967). If the Court agrees 
that the issue is not ripe, the SG asks this Court to grant the 
petn and vacate CA4's judgment on that ground, so that EPA will 
not have to modify the variance clause and the issue will be 
preserved for enforcement review. If the Court thinks that the 
issue is ripe, the SG seems to invite it to limit a grant of 
cert to the question presented on the merits. 
b. The Respondents 
First, resps contend that there is no clear conflict 
between CA4 and CADC on the standards EPA must apply in 
considering applications for a variance. Both CAs agree that 
the standards applicable 'under the BPT limitations must be 
analogous to those under the BAT limitations; both agree that 
the total cost of the technology in relation to the pollution 
reduction benefits must be considered; and both agree that this 
balancing of costs is but one factor EPA must consider. The SG 
ignores the fact that CADC's holding with respect to economic 
hardship considerations stated that such considerations "need 
not control the variance decision." It did not consider such 
factors irrelevant. Moreover, CA4 rejected the EPA's argument 
that its opinion made hardship a controlling factor: § 30l(c) 
requires that modifications based on economic capabilities of 
the discharger also "will result in reasonable further progress 
toward the elimination of the discharge of pollutants." 





review of the BPT variance regulation governing the pulp paper 
industry. Actual variance decisions arising under the 
jurisdiction of the CADC may provide this Court with the means 
of resolving any concrete conflicts that develop between the 
approaches of the two courts. (In Weyerhauser, CADC observed 
that the Appalachian Power approach to BPT variances may have 
been "somewhat broader" than its approach, evidently not 
perceiving the sharp conflict seen by the SG. See 590 F.2d at 
1036 n.35.) 
Second, the issue presented does not raise an important 
question impacting upon EPA's ability to administer the BPT 
limitations. The deadline for compliance with those 
limitations was July 1, 1977. Presumably, most petitions for 
variances have been filed by now. Moreover, Congress' goal of 
eliminating pollutant discharges will not be frustrated under 
CA4's approach, because progress toward achieving that goal is 
made a relevant factor under § 30l(c). 
Third, CA4's decision was correct. The legislative history 
quoted by the SG was not addressed to the standards applicable 
to the approval of variances. The requirement that variances 
be provided for BPT limitations was established only after this 
Court's opinion in du Pont. Both du Pont and Appalachian Power 
were decided prior to the 1977 amendments to the Act, and 
Congress disapproved neither decision. Moreover, the chairman 
of the House conferees on the Act explained that the "total 
cost" consideration required by§ 304(b) (1) (B) includes 
"external costs such as potential unemployment." Economic 
capability is thus made a relevant factor in the consideration 
c 
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of variance applications even if one does not construe the 
provisions of § 30l(c) as applicable to BPT limitations. 
Resps agree with the SG's secondary position that the 
merits of the issue presented to the CA were ripe for review. 
4. DISCUSSION: I am inclined to agree with the respondents 
that the conflict among the CAs alleged to exist here, if ~ 
~ 
indeed there is a conflict, is one that this Court need not  
CADC's opinion in Weyerhauser presents only a 
( 
resolve. 
tentative judgment that the EPA's standard variance clause may 
be flexible enough to satisfy this Court's du Pont opinion. In 
actual variance decisions that arise from that circuit, a 
clearer conflict with the approach followed in CA4 may emerge. 
It seems just as likely, however, that dischargers will find 
that issuing authorities under either CA's approach will reach 
similar decisions on waivers because of the amalgam of factors 
that are relevant. 
The CADC's opinion also provides some support for the 
resps' argument that the economic hardship concern made 
relevant in § 30l(c) to BAT limitations is also relevant, 
albeit under the total cost concept of§ 304(b) (1) (B), to BPT 
limitations. CADC accepted the definition of total costs 
offered by the chairman of the House conferees, and it thus 
concluded that "certain economic factors [potential 
unemployment, dislocation, etc.] must be considered but 
need not be decisive if associated with commensurate 
pollution-ending gains, and they do not, without more include 
the fact that the opertator is experiencing difficulty in, or 
' is unable to, absorb the costs." 590 F.2d at 1036 n.35 (my 




emphasis). It was based on this interpretation of the total 
cost concept that the CADC concluded that CA4's approach in 
Appalachian Power "may be somewhat broader than ours and was 
reached by a different analysis." Id. Given CA4's explicit 
rejection of EPA's argument that Appalachian Power makes 
economic hardship factors controlling in a variance 
application, I fail to see how the two approaches can be 
expected to yield differing results in many cases or how CA4's 
approach will lead to frustration of the Act's purposes. 
L This is not to say that Weyerhauser is completely 
1 
consistent with the arguments made by the SG here. One might 
also conclude, however, that this Court's duPont decision, 
requiring some variations in different plants, is not 
completely consistent with the legislative history cited by the 
SG. My only point is that the conflict alleged to exist 
between CA4 and CADC is theoretical at best, and may not lead 
to dissimilar practical results. 
The ripeness issue, as the SG concedes, is not 
independently certworthy. There is no conflict among the CAs 
on that point. Moreover, the decisions of CA4 and CADC appear 
correct. 
Although the question may be close, on balance I recommend 
that the petn be denied. 1her12.. cH~ 'J.. res-p~ses. 
Murphy 12/31/79 Ops in petn 
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Rec i r culated: 
Environmental Protection Agency v. National 
Crushed Stone Association; and Douglas Castle , 
Administrator, EPA, v. Consolidation Coal Co. 
MR. JUSTICE WHITE, dissenting. 
To achieve the national goal of eliminating the discharge 
of pollutants into the Nation's. navigable waters, the Federal 
Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972 (Act), 86 Stat. 
816, 33 U,S.C. § 1251 et seq., directs that by 1977 the discharge 
of pollutants was to be limited to the extent made possible by 
"the best practicable control technology currently available" 
(BPT). By 1987, more stringent limitations, based on "the best 
available technology economically available" (BAT), were to be 
observed. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) was to 
issue regulations to implement both of these standards, which 
it proceeded to do. These r egulations contained varianc e 
clauses setting fo r th the grounds upon which the EPA or an 
authorized state agency could modify or ease the requirements 
at the behest of an 
\ 
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Relying on the statutory specification of the factors 
to be considered in granting variances, as well as upon the 
legislative history, the EPA contends that the fact that an 
individual discharger may be financially incapable of footing 
the bill for the best practicable control technology currently 
available does not necessarily entitle the discharger to a 
variance from the 1977 BPT limitations. The Court of Appeals 
for the Fourth Circuit in the two cases before us disagreed 
and invalidated the variances clauses contained in the regu-
lations covering two different industries. 
The petition for certiorari of the EPA asserts that the 
two decisions will significantly affect its ability to enforce 
the water pollution control laws, that they threaten similar 
variance clauses in regulations applicable to a good many other 
industries, and that Weyerhauser v. Costle, 590 F.2d 1011 (D.C. 
Cir. 1978), sustained the identical variance provision as 
applied to the pulp and paper industry. It seems to me that 
this kind of an issue with respect to the construction of an 
extremely important and relatively new and complex statute that 
contains compliance target dates should be promptly settled by 
this Court, particularly in light of the developing conflict 
between two Courts of Appeals and the dilemma that these de-
cisions pose for the Agency. It is obvious that the issue 
\ 
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will recur, and the Court should give it plenary consideration 
now, rather than later. 
With all due respect, I would grant the petition for 
writ of certiorari and dissent from its denial. 
\ 
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MR. JrsTICE WHITE, dissenting. 
To achieve the national goal of eliminating the discharge 
of pollutants iuto the Nation's 11avigable waters. the Federal 
Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972 (Act), 
86 Htat. 816, 33 U. S. C. ~ 1251 et seq., directs that by 1977 
the discharge of pollutants was to be limited to the extent 
made possible by "the best practicable control technology 
currently available" (BPT). By 1987. more stringent limi~ 
tations, basetl on "the best availabl!'l technology economically 
available" (BAT), were to be observed. The Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA) was to issue regulations to imple-
ment both of these standards. which it proceeded to do. 
These regulations contained variance clauses setting forth 
the grounds upon which the EPA or an authorized state 
agency could modify or ease the requirements at the behest 
of an individual discharger. 
Relying on the statutory specification of the factors to be 
considered iu granting variances, as well as upon the legisla-
tive history , the EPA contends that the fact that an individual 
discharger may be financially incapable of footing the bill for 
the best practicable control technology currently available 
would not eutitle the discharger to a variance from the 1977 
BPT limitations and need not be considered. The Court of 
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in the two cas('s before us 
disagreetl and invalidated the variances clauses contained in 
the regulations covering two different industries. 
The pPtition for certiorari of the EPA asserts that the two 
decisions will significantly affect its ability to enforce the 
2 EPA v. NATIONAL CRUSHED STOKE ASSN. 
water pollution control laws, that they threaten similar vari-
ance clauses in regulations applicable tp a good many other 
industries, and that Weyerhauser v. Castle, 590 F. 2q 1011 
(D. C. Cir. 1978), sustained the identical variance provision 
as applied to the pulp and paper industry. It seems to me 
that this kind of an issue with res1~ect to the construction of 
ap extremely important and relatively new and complex 
statute that contains compliauce t~rget dates should be 
promptly settled by this Court, particularly in light of the 
d13veloping conflict between two Co4rts of Appeals and the 
dilemma that these decisions pose for the Agency. It is 
obvious that the issue will recur, and the Court shollld give 
it plenary consideration now, rather than later. 
With all due respect, + would grant the petition fo~ writ 
of certiorari and dissent from its denial. 
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July 8, 1980 
Linda, 
Please advise each of my new clerks that 
I am out of this case. I do not want one of 




JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL, JR. 
0. 7 -77 I 
~nn:t <l}ltltrl of tlft ~tb ,jtaftg 
.. asJtingbrn, ~. <!}. 2.llbf~~ · 
1y , 1980 
tional Cr 1. 
November 12, 1980 
70-770 EPA v. National Crushed Stone Association 
Dear Byron: 
Please show on the next draft of your opinion that 




Mr. Justice White 
lfp/ss 
The Conference 
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